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Abstract 
 This paper explains the emergence of a conditional norm of 
corruption on an mesosocial level between culture and structure. It considers 
corruption as a result of interactions between individuals through social 
norms. In a game theory perspective, we show that the tolerance of 
corruption is dependent on the social norms generated by mutual betting on 
other people’s behavior in society. Players tend to align their own strategy 
with the strategy of others. Therefore, a social norm of corruption is 
determined by the proportion of players who adopt a corruption strategy. The 
choice between corruption and honesty depends on a specific social norm. 
Analysis of corruption in Lebanon shows that corruption as a phenomenon is 
contagious and frequent to the point of tolerating it as a social norm.  
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Introduction  
 Corruption is an illegal and unethical behavior by a public official in 
order benefit from it, usually related to a bribe. It is also linked to the illegal 
use of public power and to illegal activities, regardless of the difficulty of 
separating between what is legitimate and what is not. Debates on corruption 
are extremely complex because the concept of corruption is ambiguous to 
define. All definitions are stained with subjectivity because some activities 
may be considered as improper or corrupted in some countries but not in 
others. Some activities are carried out behind stages and outside the formal 
and legal channels, which makes their measurement and the means of 
containing them even more difficult.  
 However, some activities, such as exchanging gifts, lead to some 
form of corruption without breaching regulations. For this reason, the 
analysis of corruption should take into account the social, cultural, political, 
moral, and psychological features of a country in a global framework in 
order to really understand the phenomenon. The tremendous scale of 
corruption and the widespread of shady transactions in Lebanon prompt us to 
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look closer at the emergence of social norms of corruption in the country. 
The originality of Lebanon’s case resides in the fact that it contains all forms 
of corruption; it can vary from Petty Corruption that occurs at a small scale 
to Grand Corruption that occurs at the larger scale of government in a way 
that affects the political, legal and economic systems. For instance, public 
vote buying is not sanctioned in Lebanon, and may be a major asset in any 
election. 
 Some approaches link corruption to a cultural phenomenon tied to 
unethical or defective behavior. Other approaches try to explain corruption 
by the bad structure of economy and by government failure [Cartier-Bresson 
2000]. This paper explains that corruption should be explained in reference 
to social norms. It cannot only be explained by bad governance which is 
related to fragile public structures or merely by the lack of culture and ethics. 
Only an intermediate explanation focusing on the issue of the perception of 
corruption based on social norm is plausible.  
 The case of corruption in Lebanon is interesting to analyze since this 
phenomenon is rampant in the country and is not only explained by a lack of 
culture or bad structure. The acceptance of corrupt transactions is reflected in 
the Lebanese people perceptions: a phenomenon so ordinary that it no longer 
needs to be eradicated. What makes that 23.3%109 of the Lebanese people 
tolerate bribe against 1% in Switzerland? Do Lebanese have an interest in 
not being honest? Has corruption become a social rule?  
 To provide an answer to these questions, this paper uses a utilitarian 
approach in which individuals make a cost-benefit analysis before deciding 
whether it is rational to be honest or corrupt. We present a dynamic model to 
explain the emergence of a social norm of corruption as a result of rational 
strategies by players, in a game theory model where the two players are 
betting on the behavior of the other. The model proves that it is irrational not 
to be corrupted in a society characterized by endemic corruption. As an 
application, we explore the case of Lebanon, presenting the corruption as an 
accepted behavior which outbalances the failure of public institutions. 
 The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: section 1 presents a 
brief analysis of the emergence of conditional norms related to corruption. 
The second section of the paper displays a game theory model that shows the 
emergence of conditional norms through rational strategies. The last section 
discusses the emergence of a social norm of corruption in Lebanon where it 
is tolerable by all citizens.  
 
 
                                                          
109 Referring to the world values survey; Question: how far the bribe is an accepted or 
justified. The answers are presented in 10 levels ranging from "always justifiable" to "not 
justifiable". 
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The emergence of social norms of corruption  
 Economists have long disregarded social norms as a key explanation 
of rational behavior so it is really crucial to integrate the analysis of social 
norms while studying corruption since it is an individualistic decision. The 
core issue regarding the norm of corruption is that it exceeds the agreement 
between the players dealing with corruption to involve all citizens because 
corruption has a social repercussion on the whole society as a unit. 
Following the approach of the impartial spectator that Adam Smith used in 
his moral philosophy110, individuals give their approval or disapproval on 
any social issue based on a social assessment. According to Smith, one may 
approve or disapprove his own personal conduct based on other’s perception. 
Social expectation of other people’s behavior leads to the emergence of a 
social norm of corruption.  
 The norm of tolerance does not only require an acceptance on the 
individual level. The problem is stated in a broader perspective which 
involves virtually all participants in social activity: “Is it acceptable to be 
corrupted?” and “Do other people around me accept a corrupted behavior?”. 
The prospect of the emergence of a norm of tolerance does not depend solely 
on individual choices (accept or not accept) but involves an anticipation on 
the choices of others (whether is it was acceptable to others or not). It is not 
merely a positive or descriptive issue referring to an individual acceptance or 
not, it is also a prescriptive one. The emergence of conditional norms of 
corruption is therefore related to the normative agreement within a group: I 
do accept to pay a bribe if I am expected to pay one; “I” do agree approve 
that “you” receive an officious payment if it is socially unacceptable for “us” 
to refuse what so called a “gift”.  
 As stated by James Coleman [1990], the study of social norms is 
essential for any theory that relies on individual choice. According to 
Coleman, social norm is defined as a rule of conduct shared by individuals 
and backed by a sanction. The approach followed by this article falls within 
this framework where corruption depends on the observation of other’s 
behavior. Elster [1989] considered the social norms as the “cement of the 
society”. For this reason, it seems important to include the analysis of social 
norms when analyzing corruption. 
 It is noteworthy that corruption in Lebanon doesn’t generate any 
feeling of guilt among individuals, which encourages citizens to twist the 
law. Violation of the norm doesn’t generate a sense of shame and this feeling 
drives people to accept corrupt behavior. Generalization of corruption in 
Lebanon is not only explained by the bad structure of the government and its 
                                                          
110 Smith points out that in every social and moral interaction two individuals make their 
judgments from the point of view of a third impartial spectator.  
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bad governance111 and its incompetency to provide the basic services in the 
country. The main limit of this approach is that it puts aside all moral and 
individual freedom when taking decisions and doesn’t explain why 
corruption exists in developed countries. This structural approach doesn’t 
explain the high level of corruption in some countries such as Italy112, nor 
why the north of Italy is less corrupted than the south of the country 
[Putnam, 1993].  
 On the other hand, corruption is not only a cultural problem related to 
a lack of ethics and education or non-civic behavior by citizens. This cultural 
approach has its limits too because it argues that some cultures are superior 
to others, and may lead to essentialist, social Darwinist, or even racial 
theories.  
 The approach suggested in this paper emphasizes on the fact that 
corruption is analyzed on a level between culture and structure. The thesis 
defended in the following paper draws a line between two perspectives both 
considered insufficient: 
- the first perspective is structuralist113 [Mauro, 1996]. According to this 
perspective, corruption is related to the failure of economic and institutional 
structures. In this sense, corrupt behavior is only a reflection of poor 
economic performance, low GDP and administrative burdens in business 
[Klitgaard 1991]. 
- The second perspective is the culturalist approach114. It attributes 
corruption to subjective causes related to the culture and values of a society 
[Elster, 1989]. Accordingly, corrupt behavior is the result of failing to 
comply with ethical standards and civics.  
 Contrary to these two assertions, we suggest a three-scale rationale 
analyzing corruption between culture and structure, starting from a macro-
societal scale referring to the structuralist approach and going towards a 
culturalist micro-societal approach.  
 More precisely, our approach refers to three scales: 
- Macro-societal scale linked to the failing structure of the State. 
                                                          
111 According to the indicator of the World Bank, Government Effectiveness, the score of 
Lebanon is 38 over 100; The index values range between 0 and 100, the maximum value 
100 means the most efficient service. Government Effectiveness measures the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation. 
112  According to Transparency International, the CPI (Corruption Perception Index) for 
Lebanon was 28 over 100 for 2016. (A low level of the CPI index refers to a high level of 
perception of corruption). The CPI of Italy is 44 while the CPI of New Zealand is 90.  
113 According to the structuralist perspective in sociology, human’s behavior is analyzed in 
term of his relation to a system or a structure.  
114 The culturalism focuses on the importance of culture in human behavior.  
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- Micro-societal scale interprets the behavior of corruption as an individual 
choice.  
 -Meso societal scale; The approach suggested in this paper focuses on 
the mutual betting of the behavior of other members of society. Under this 
intermediate approach, corruption is contagious and the probability of not 
following the rules depends on anticipating the behavior of the other within a 
framework of mutual expectations. 
 Corruption should be explained by the interaction between citizens 
that leads to the establishment of a social norm of corruption. The 
commitment of individuals in corrupt activities depends on the disutility of 
guilt, feelings perceived by the behavior of other individuals in society. In 
this perspective, the payment of the bribe and the propensity to bribe 
depends on the frequency of corruption. It stresses on the importance of 
cooperation and coordination between individuals because the social 
sanctions will force the agents to abide by the norm. In Lebanon, where 
corruption is systemic, the norm that emerges led to its acceptance because 
it’s an infectious phenomenon. The choice of individuals between an honest 
behavior and a corrupted one can vary depending on the frequency and 
intensity of social punishment. 
 
The emergence of conditional corruption and interactions: the 
contribution of game theory 
 We suggest a model that attempts to explain the reasons why some 
societies tolerate corruption, while others do not. In some societies, 
individuals have an advantage in being corrupted. The general equilibrium of 
the suggested model depends on the interaction between individuals. 
 Suppose a model115 in which two individuals Peter and July live in 
the same country and have the choice between compliance to rules 
established by the state without twisting the law ("Do not use corruption") or 
the non-compliance to existing rules and the use of corruption (the strategy 
"user of the corruption"). If people apply the laws, the state requires 
individuals to pay a tax (I). (I) represents the tax paid to the state to enforce 
property rights and thus constitutes its main revenues to carry out policies 
against corruption. If individuals are corrupt, they will pay a bribe (b) that 
represents the individual cost of corruption. In addition, the use of corruption 
entails for corrupt players an amount (R) related to the rent-seeking. On the 
other hand, when people do not respect the rules, they support in addition to 
the individual cost of corruption, a social costs (C). C is paid by the whole 
society. For a given population, θ measures the proportion of individuals 
                                                          
115 The model suggested in this paper is based on a model in game theory developed by 
professor Lemennicier on "The nature of the state and the state of nature 
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who use corruption and (1 - θ) the proportion of individuals who do not 
make use of corruption.  
 If both players are engaged in corruption, the gain will be: 
 
 Let p be the probability of winning, and here taking the value 1/2 
since the probability is uncertain. We assume that G = 1 / 2 (R - b) - C is 
negative. 
  Peter 
  Use corruption Do not use corruption 
July 
Use corruption 
 
 
Do not use corruption 
 (G - I)
 
Table 1 - Matrix of gains 
 
 If both players do not make use of corruption, the gain is positive and 
equal to (G - I). If July uses corruption and Peter does not use it, July will 
have a positive gain equal to (R - b). If July does not use corruption, while 
Peter does, July pays (-I) and loses everything. 
Gain from  "Use Corruption” 
E(G) = θ [1/2 (R –b) –C] + (1- θ) [R –b] 
• Si  θ = 0     E(G) =  
• Si  θ = 1      
Gain from "Do not use corruption" 
E(G) = θ (-I) + (1- θ) (G – I)  
• Si  θ = 0     E(G) =  
• Si  θ = 1     
 There is no dominant strategy in this game, there are several mixed 
strategies. This game will be studied in two cases: 
Assumptions of the first case Assumptions of the second case 
R-b > G-I R-b < G-I 
(-I)  >  
(-I)  <  
Table 2 - Assumptions of the game 
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First case 
 Under the assumptions of the first case, the gain from using 
corruption is higher than the gain of not using corruption when θ tends to 
zero. From a certain threshold θ*, the gain from not using corruption is 
higher. For a given population, θ* is the threshold at which it is irrelevant for 
July to use corruption. 
 If we represent in a graph the coordination between Peter and July, 
we find that the strategy "use of the corruption” is dominant as the point B 
gives an additional gain compared to Point C. 
 But if Peter adopts the same strategy of spoliation, July has an 
interest in adopting the "Do not use corruption"(D > A). As the interaction is 
symmetric, once the threshold exceeded θ* everyone's interest is to respect 
the rule. Conversely, if the threshold is not met, all have an interest to use 
corruption. 
θ = 0   Gain from using corruption > Gain not using corruption 
θ = 1   Gain from using corruption < Gain not using corruption 
 
Figure 1 - The game based on the assumptions of the first case 
 
Second case 
Under the assumptions of the second case, the gain from using 
corruption is lower than the gain does not use corruption when θ tends to 
zero. Once the threshold is exceeded, everyone's interest is to use corruption. 
Conversely, if the threshold is not met, all have an interest in complying with 
the rules. If the ratio "θ" increases beyond θ*, the cost of corruption is higher 
than that of compliance. When the share of corrupt individuals in the 
population increases, "Use of corruption" becomes the dominant strategy. 
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Figure 2 - The game based on the assumptions of the second case 
 
θ = 0 Gain from using corruption < Gain from not using corruption 
θ = 1 Gain from using corruption > Gain from not using corruption 
 
 The choice between the path of corruption or honesty depends on 
several criteria, foremost among which we find the extent of corruption and 
the proportion of corrupt individuals in the society. 
 
Conclusion of the second case  
 If θ > θ* agents expect a high level of corruption, so they will have 
incentive to engage in corrupt activities and θ tend to 1 since the strategy to 
use corruption entailed more social gains. 
 This second case will interest us since we'll apply it later to the 
Lebanese case where corruption is rampant. In a society where corruption 
provides more gain to its members, it would be rational to be corrupted and 
accept corrupt behavior of others. Thus a norm for tolerance of corruption 
emerges indicating that it is irrational not to be corrupt in a society where 
everybody is corrupt. 
 
Estimation of the threshold θ* 
 E (G use corruption) = E (G does not use corruption) 
 = Net Increase from the use of corruption) / (Cost from the use of 
corruption) 
θ * is positive with (R-b) - (G-I) > 0 and C> G - ½ (R- b). 
If C < G - ½ (R-b), tolerance of corruption does not depend on the proportion 
of corrupt people. 
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Discussions on the emergence of a social norm in Lebanon 
 The game presented in our model explains the emergence of a 
spontaneous order in which agents learn by trial and error or by imitating the 
behavior of others. Therefore, we assume that the equilibrium depends on the 
anticipation of the proportion of those who are corrupt, hence on the extent 
of corruption. The choice between the path of corruption and honesty is 
explained by the emergence of a conditional norm.  
 This norm explains why some countries not only tolerate corruption, 
but also consider it to be rational while others severely sanction any 
defective attitude.  In developed countries, people are expecting honest 
behavior from others citizens, they are inclined to respect the regulations to 
avoid social and legal sanctions anticipating that a faulty behavior will be 
severely punished. Any deviation from this equilibrium of honesty will be 
severely sanctioned by society and by the State alike. Citizens are inclined to 
be honest because the cost of violating social norms is higher than its 
benefits (Becker, 1968). In this case, the norm that emerges is a norm of 
honesty and the society will impose social sanctions on corrupted citizens. 
More importantly, in this equilibrium, I tend to be honest because I expect 
YOU to be honest and because I expect YOU to expect ME to be honest 
since WE expect that a dishonest behavior would be sanctioned. 
 Conversely, if corruption is endemic, the strategy that brings the 
greatest gain to citizens is that of no “honesty”. In countries where 
corruption is high, public policies are inefficient leading to the acceptance of 
corruption. This explains why Lebanese citizens expecting a dishonest 
behavior from politicians are inclined to avoid paying taxes without feeling 
any guilt. And they may even justify publicly their corrupted behavior by 
claiming that public funds will be stolen both ways by other corrupted 
officials, without worrying about any social sanction. According to 
Governance indicators116 published by the World Bank, the governance in 
Lebanon is bad and this is explained by the low scores regarding political 
instability (17.39 /100) and the lack of accountability (39.42/100), (table 2).   
Governance indicators 2015 
Voice and accountability 39.42 
Political stability 17.39 
Government effectiveness 48.29 
Regulatory quality 50 
Rule of law 43.54 
Control of corruption 38.54 
Table 2: Governance indicators; Percentile rank; World Bank; 2015 
                                                          
116 According to the governance indicators, the index values range between 0 and 100, the 
maximum value 100 means the better quality of governance. 
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 Social norms are highly relevant to understanding corruption in 
Lebanon. When individual agents in their daily interactions produce norms 
of tolerance toward corruption, they rely primarily on observing and 
anticipating the behavior of "others" defining a network of mutual 
expectations. In other words, in regions characterized by high levels of 
uncivilized behavior, people tolerate bad behavior from their neighbors 
because the latter also tolerate and accept their malpractices. In this sense, 
once the percentage of corrupt people exceeds a critical threshold, it becomes 
difficult to avoid the use of corruption in an environment where the bribe is 
perceived as not only "normal", but more legitimate, rational and justified. 
Year CPI117 Transparency 
2006 3.6 
2007 3.0 
2008 3.0 
2009 2.5 
2010 2.5 
2011 2.5 
2012 3.0 
2013 2.8 
2014 2.7 
2015 2.8 
2016 2.8 
Table 1: Corruption Perception Indicator; Lebanon  
 
 With regard to Lebanon, corruption is rampant in the country 
according to Transparency International (table 1). The score of CPI that 
measures the perception of corruption is decreasing moving from 3.6 in 2006 
to 2.8 in 20016. A contagion effect of corruption has been observed and 
citizens tolerate corruption it since it is socially accepted. For this reason, in 
a context of absence of transparency and efficiency, avoiding paying taxes is 
not socially punished by the society. Predicting a deficient behavior from 
other citizens, and predicting that the government will dilapidate fiscal 
revenues makes it rational not to pay taxes. As discussed previously, it is 
irrational not to be corrupted in a society where corruption is widely spread 
where perception of corruption θ exceeds the threshold (case 2 of the model 
when θ > θ*). This social norm can be illustrated in the Lebanese society by 
the normalization of the bribe, the purchase of votes or the stealing of 
electricity from the main grid. Hence, individual action clearly depends on 
conditional social norms, taking the form of betting on the behavior of the 
                                                          
117 Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International. 
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other. In light of this, it has become rational for individuals to modify their 
strategies.  
 In a context of generalized corruption, reciprocity means that people 
will feel less guilty indulging corrupt activities. In a fractured society like 
that of Lebanon, citizens are of different religious background have no 
mutual trust toward each other due to years of struggling in civil war. As a 
result, the likelihood of anticipating defective behavior is higher in a 
fragmented and segregated society, which increases the propensity to be 
corrupt. The Lebanese pessimistic bets on the failing behavior of their fellow 
citizens confirm the theoretical model borrowed from game theory. 
 
Conclusion 
 Corruption is not always a cultural problem tied to unethical or 
defective behavior. Nor is it explained by structural factors related to bad 
governance. It is a result of interactions between individuals through the 
social norms based on a mutual betting of the behavior of other members of 
society. The game model explored how a conditional norm of corruption 
could emerge in an intermediate level between cultural and structure. 
 It’s important to note that corruption in Lebanon is prevalent and so 
frequent that condoning it has become a social norm. Referring to our model 
in game theory, since the perception of corruption is high (θ > θ*), agents 
observe the reaction of others into a network of mutual expectations. 
Applying the conclusions of the game theory to the case of Lebanon, 
corruption is seen as a survival strategy. It is justified by a weak State, given 
the poor quality of public institutions and the competition between political 
parties within an ethnic, religious and political framework. But corruption 
practices are mainly developed because the socio-cultural environment is 
tolerant, even encouraging. This leads to the emergence of a "culture of 
gifts", the offer of bribe being considered as courtesy. For this reason, 
corruption cannot be analyzed disregarding moral, social and cultural 
criteria. The distinction between a lawful and illicit transaction depends to a 
large extent on societies and cultures, which means that it can vary across 
time and space.  
 To this end, it is necessary to define a specific moral criterion to each 
society and link studies of corruption to the role of the State. All policies 
suggest that tackling corruption should take into account the perception of 
corruption and the social norms that have emerged. However, if corruption 
became the social norm as for the case of Lebanon, any government 
intervention would be ineffective since corruption became the rule. All 
policies seem to be inefficient since corruption is considered as a defensive 
strategy for rational agents to protect themselves from the corruption of 
politicians.  
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